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MEENA ACI-IARYA 
MoNARCHY, DEMOCRACY, DoNoRs, AND THE 
CPN-MAOIST MovEMENT IN NEPAL: 
A LESSON FOR INFANT DEMOCRACIES 
This paper reviews the current politi cal cri sis in Nepal in hi storical , socioeconomic , and geopolitical 
contex ts . On the basis of fa cts and fi gures , on the politica l side, it is concluded that democraC)' must 
grow from withi n and the structure s that develop mu st represe nt ex isting political forc es within the 
country. Similarly, e fforts at g loba li zation must take into account th e nature of the economy. Global-
iza tion is viewed as a multi -dimensional process creating a culture of unlimited wants and mass rve 
di ssat is fac tion with condition s of deprivation. Thi s s ituation c reates fertile g round for in surgenc y of 
a ll kinds, as ev ident from the current global s ituation , wh ich includes Ne pal. ln this context the pa-
per sees ver y lilli e prospec t for agreement w ith the tvlaoi sts, who have a complete ly social ist agenda. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nepal is facing an all-round crisis, encompassing 
all aspects of life-economic, social, political, and 
cultural. An insurgency led by the extreme left 
Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-Maoist) has been 
going on since 1996. The insurgency has spread in 
various intensities to all 75 districts . The United 
Nations National Development Program (UNDP) 
estimates (quoted by the World Bank, 2004) that 
significant conflicts are raging in 36 districts (see 
map, opposite page), creating a third degree security 
problem for the donors, and 15 districts are affected 
less intensively by the conflict problems, the second-
degree security problem. Only 24 districts are 
considered moderately secure for the donors and 
government officials who work there. Civil society 
organizations or individuals need permission from 
and pay levies to the Maoists to work in rural areas 
in most parts of the country [see Haddix-McKay, this 
volume]. About 10,128 people have died as of March 
2004 (Informal Sector Service Center [INSEC], 
2004). Thousands have been rendered homeless, 
thousands of women and children have lost their 
livelihood providers, and hundreds of children 
have been orphaned. Physical infrastructure worth. 
US$ 250 million has been destroyed (Dhungel, 
2004); tourism and manufacturing growth have 
been severely affected; transport costs have risen 
for both exports and imports; and a substantial part 
of the budget has been diverted from development 
to maintaining security. Economic growth has 
slackened significantly. 
Inquiring into the genesis and rapid growth of this 
I , 
movement is a complex task. The current crisis may 
be attributed to multiple causes, political, economic, 
and social. 1 
FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES 
Nepal was ruled by the autocratic Rana family in 
the name of the king from 1846 to 1950, and by the 
king himself until1990. A brief period of democratic 
experimentation during the 1950s ended in a royal 
coup in 1960. For thirty years, the country was 
ruled by the king directly, with a fa <;ade of elected 
institutions called Panchayats at the village, district, 
and national level: the Panchayat system. The current 
phase of democratic governance began in 1990, when 
then-King Birendra gave in to the popular demand 
for democracy. A new democratic constitution, 
promulgated in 1991, was a compromise between 
the king and the leading political parties of the 
time. Both the Nepali Congress (NC) and t~e Left 
United Front (whose important leaders are now 
in either The Communist Party [United Marxist-
Leninist, CPN-UML] or the insurgent Communist 
Party of Nepal [CPN-Maoist]), played major roles 
in these negotiations. The constitution established 
a democratic system of governance with the King 
as the constitutional Monarch, and set forth funda-
mental rights of speech , association, and political 
participation without discrimination on the basis of 
sex, ethnicity, caste, race, or religion for all citizens. 
The guiding principles embodied in the constitution 
make women's equality and elimination of all kinds 
of economic and social inequities a priority. The Left 
Nepal's failure in 
participatory gov-
ernance has been 
monumental. The 
responsibilities 
for this failure 
are attributable 
to all the political 
parties, the elite 
groups, and- not 
least- the donors. 
Front accepted the constitution, 
though vvith reservations even at 
that time about the Monarchy. The 
debate has continued. 
The provision identifying Nepal 
as a Hindu Kingdom, and prior-
ity accorded to Nepali language, 
were also debated as the constitu-
tion was developed. The issue of 
a federal-versus-unitary state was 
raised weakly by the Madeshis 
(people native to southern plains), 
and has acquired more strength 
recently with the support of many 
janajati groups (ethnic communi-
ties, which constitute about 32 
percent of the total population). 
The constitution also specifies that 
all political parties must put up at 
least 5 percent female candidates 
for election to the House of Representatives (lower house). 
The upper house, to which members are nominated by the 
political parties on the basis of their respective strength in 
the lower house, must have at least three women among the 
60 members. The constitution guarantees equal rights to 
all citizens, but the citizenship chapter of the constitution 
and subsequent Acts discriminate against women in several 
ways. For example, the constitution does not recognize ma-
ternal descent for natural citizenship rights, or treat the for-
eign spouses of male and female citizens equally. Similarly, 
equal property rights are guaranteed to all citizens within 
the laws, which themselves may discriminate against wom-
en. Citizenship is also an issue for recent migrants to Nepal, 
who acquired it only after 1962: their children and other 
dependents who were minors at that time have no right to 
Nepali citizenship. Although according to the constitution, 
Nepal is a Hindu Kingdom, people may practice other reli-
gions, but may not convert others. Primary education is to 
be available in the mother tongue, and people have a right to 
protect their own language and culture. The guiding prin-
ciples make the state responsible for protection of all Nepal's 
languages and culture, but only Nepali is recognized as a 
state language. 
Thus there are certain inequities embodied in the consti-
tution itself. But more fundamental problems lie in function-
ing of democratic' institutions and in mechanisms for dealing 
with legitimate grievances raised by the people. Under the 
democracy such instit::ttions are comprised of t~e political 
parties, civil society, local self-government, free-and-fair 
elections, and the rule of law (Dhal, 1990). Nepal's failure 
in participatory governance has been monumental. The re-
sponsibilities for this failure are attributable to all the politi-
cal parties, the elite groups, and-not least-the donors. 
After 1990, people had high expectations that politi-
cal leaders would pay much more attention to the people's 
problems than in the previous sys-
tem. During the democratic move-
ments of 1989-1990, the leaders 
spoke of changes in everything 
from the drinking water problem of 
Kathmandu to freedom from pov-
erty, without anticipating that they 
would be held immediately respon-
sible for such promises. 
Further, Nepal has been swamped 
by international human rights or-
ganizations and non-government 
organizations (NGOs). Their sup-
port for particular causes (e.g. in-
digenous people in a country where 
the concept is totally out of context; 
the right of education in the mother 
tongue, where there are more than 
60 languages, many of them with-
out scripts; or the right of conver-
sion, where conversion is mostly by Christian Missionaries 
from outside the country), has encouraged an explosion of 
expectations. Such issues were exploited extensively both 
by the CPN-Maoists and the monarchist groups, who were 
opposed to the democratic changes of 1990. All these issues 
may be legitimate from a democratic perspective, but they 
put an inordinate stress on Nepal's infant democracy. 
The political parties and the donors remained oblivious 
to the brewing turmoil. While the donors offered assistance 
and pushed for market oriented reforms and privatization, 
the political parties in power, both in government and in 
opposition, operated in an ideological vacuum. The Nepali 
Congress , which ruled the country for 11 out of 14 years 
after 1990, was a social democratic party in principle. lt lost 
its ideological ground in the face of the international assault 
on the mixed economy and its principles. The CPN-UML 
also had to grope for its ideological anchor as the social-
ist/communist systems were dismantled. All the democratic 
channels for political participation, elections, media, local 
governments, and NGOs-e.g., farmer's groups, women's 
groups, professional associations, various ethnic/caste 
groups, trade unions etc-became bogged down in the pa-
rochial struggles of the groups and political parties devoid of 
principles. Thus, most institutions that might have exerted 
democratic checks and balances became dysfunctional , leav-
ing the field entirely to the CPN-Maoists. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Nepal's political spectrum includes multiple parties and 
many divisions. (Chart 1 outlines the current political 
party scenario .) But most can be classified in two major 
groups: left, which ranges from the extreme left to the social 
democrats of various shades; and the so-called democratic 
forces, from republicans to monarchists. Major groups on 
the left are the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist-
Leninist-that is, CPN-Ulv!L-social democrats) and the 
CPN-Maoists. The two Nepali Congress Parties (NC) and 
the Nepal Sadvabana Party (NSP), those with representation 
in the outgoing Parliament, have a democratic platform 
allowing minimum power to the King. NC (D) and Rastriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP) believe in democracy within the 
present constitution and thus are closest to the position of 
the King. Other smaller party positions lie somewhere in 
bet\veen these major positions. 
Political Spectrum and Parties in Nepal (see Chart l.) 
Political parties are the most important channel for people's 
interaction with the governance process (Budge and Kernan, 
1990). Parties in functioning democracies usually seek 
office with a set of policies, then try to implement them once 
in power. But in Nepal, political parties have shown only 
office-seeking behavior. Party politics was banned between 
1960 and 1990, and political parties had to · function 
underground. This led to a situation in which the parties 
advocating democratic governance in the country did not 
practice democracy in their internal functioning. Although 
the constitution explicitly states that there must be a law 
under which parties would function (Covenant, 113), its 
promulgation took five long years (Rajbhandari et al., 2000) 
and it is still not implemented. 
The country ·witnessed a disappointing period character-
ized by unprincipled and shifting alliances among political 
parties grabbing power and unwilling to sit in opposition in 
the Parliament. Parties bribed parliamentarians in order to 
stay in power or pull down the government in power, and 
were unwilling to face the electorate when out of govern-
ment. There was blatant misuse of public resources in one's 
party's interest; favoritism and nepotism in allocation of 
public resources; unprincipled interventions in bureaucracy 
and other public enterprises; and extensive corruption. Ma-
jor political parties were exposed as incapable of democratic 
governance (Acharya, 1998; Institute for Integrated Devel-
opment Studies [liDS], 1996). There were 12 governments 
in 12 years between 1990-2002 (Dhungel, 2004) and major 
political parties split and re-combined. 
Parties also fostered a culture of corruption and graft. 
Political parties promoted corruption at the individual and 
party level, and showed neither transparency nor account-
ability in their functioning, in their se lection of candidates 
for elections, in elect ion of party presidents and other party 
officials, nor in their funding sources and expenditure al-
locations (Thapa, 2002) 
judging by their behavior during the decade, major politi-
ca l parties in Nepal have lacked a clear philosophy-except 
for gaining power. The Nepa li Congress, which started by 
advocating social democracy and a mixed economy, veered 
to the right with globalization policies that further mar-
ginalized the poor. In a country where the majority of the 
population is poor, lacks primary education and the skills 
demanded by a modernizing and globalizing economy, and 
faces severe competition from imported labor in the job mar-
ket, unrestricted liberalizat ion without any effort to expand 
job opportunities for Nepali nationals was bound to be un-
popular. 
The United Marxist-Leninists were also not able to accom-
modate their concern for the poor within the framework of a 
globalizing economy. Their economic and political manifes-
tos were not much different from those of the Nepali Con-
gress . The Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), a collection of 
ex-Panchayat leaders, is slightly right of the Nepali Congress. 
Its policies may veer to the right or left as political expedi-
ency requires. The Nepal Sadvabana Party (NSP) advocates 
the sectar ian interests of the Madhesia population without 
showing any originality in its economic programs. 
Because of the practical similarity in the economic policies 
advocated by the major parties in parliament, differentiating 
among them has been difficult. 2 The degree to which each party 
agreed to adhere to the national interest was one such element, 
manifested in the politics of water resources and relations to 
lndia3 Another major issue was the efficiency of governance 
bureaucracy, which deteriorated rapidly after 1991, because of 
party politics (Khafle, 2002, Rajbhandari et al. , 2000). 
In sum, credibility became a major problem for all po-
litical parties. They made extravagant promises and raised 
unrealistic expectations vvhen out of power, and once in 
power found themselves in complete confusion when they 
had to implement policies exactly opposite what they had 
demanded when in opposition. 
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Chart l. Current Political Spectrum 
VOTING AND THE ELECTORATE 
The voter turnout in parliamentary elections in Nepal was 
quite high (60-70 percent). Nevertheless, this turnout was 
often attributed to vote buying, and, sometimes, to illegal 
practices such as booth-capturing, one person voting in 
the names of others, etc. This was possible because voters 
were unaware of national issues. A study completed in 1992 
(liDS, 1993) reported that more than 47 percent of the 1780 
respondents tabulated were not aware of the tenure of office 
or the number of members in the House of Representatives, 
the number of votes required to amend the constitution, or 
the process of selection of the Prime Minister. Only about 19 
percent of them intended to vote as per their party association. 
The decisive factor reported in their voting behavior was the 
candidate's personality, defined as his honesty, likeability, 
and past contributions. Nearly half of the respondents 
had no electoral involvement at all. Nevertheless, about 28 
percent were involved in the electoral process. A later study 
(1996) drew similar conclusions. 
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Local governments also channel citizen participation in day-
to-day governance. Many of the matters of vital interest to 
ordinary citizens, such as drinking water and sanitation, 
the environment, and management of schools and health 
facilities including hospitals, are usually allocated to local 
governments . These issues are of immediate concern to 
citizens. Moreover, local leaders are more approachable. 
Their activities are scrutinized and judged by the local 
population directly, on day-to-day basis. Therefore, in their 
own interests, local leaders need to be alert and responsive 
to local needs. In many cases, they may be recalled by 
their constituents. Modern complex governance requires 
that people at higher levels of decision-making have time 
to concentrate on the national and international policies 
affecting the nation. For efficient management of day-to-
day affairs, people close to the issues at hand need adequate 
autonomy in decision-making. People should be as close to 
the process of governance as possible. 
In Nepal, local self-government got its start in 1975. But 
not until the Local Government Act of 1993 did resource 
management and development planning devolve to local 
bodies, which were to function as local self-governments, 
though without legislative or judicial powers except in mat-
ters of resource mobilization (in limited areas). However, a 
fundamental problem left unattended was the role of the bu-
reaucracy, recruited and managed centrally but stationed in 
districts and villages and expected to function under the lo-
cal-self government bodies. Further, because of overwhelm-
ing party interventions even in the recruitment of secretaries 
at the village level, and in the face of the Central Govern-
ment's reluctance to relinquish centrally implemented proj-
ects, bureaucracies became dysfunctional (Dahal, 2001). 
THE PRESS AND THE MEDIA. 
Mass media plays a powerful role in the modern world in 
shaping public opinion. Mass media can generate awareness 
of issues , promote a high level of mass participation in the 
decision-making process, and activate and maintain a public 
mechanism to regulate, balance, restrain, and control the 
powers of the decision makers (See Aditya, 1996). In modern 
democracies the media-the fourth estate-is supposed 
to be above partisan politics, acting as keepers of social 
conscience, raising a voice for justice and equity, protecting 
the interests of the underdogs, and generally protecting 
the democratic value system. However, in practice the 
mainstream media remain under control of various groups 
within the ruling elite even in developed democracies (see 
Greider, 1992; Cohen and Solomon, 1995). 
Nepal's private sector media , suppressed during the 30 
years of the Panchayat era, have yet to mature as a channel 
of public participation in the process of governance. First, 
media suffers from the political fragmentation observed in 
the society. There is no independent source of funding, and 
the media is bound to toe the lines of individual politicians 
or political parties for specific favors. Most of the media are 
viewed as instruments of partisan politics or foreign parties. 
Moreover, they lack professionalism and access to informa-
tion. Ambivalence in His Majesty's Government's media 
policy has compounded problems (Aditya, 1996; Pokharel, 
1998). Most media lack a balanced perspective on gender 
and equity. Naturally, the party in power and their leaders' 
speeches dominate the government media. International TV 
channels propagate modern consumerism and the values of 
a globalizing economy, trivializing violence, and presenting 
the viewpoint of the dominant powers. 
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) 
AND COMMUNITY- BASED ORGANIZATIONS 
(CBOS) 
NGOs, following Walzer (1996), may be defined as "non-state 
power oriented-people's associations and organizations." 
This definition excludes political parties. NGOs in developed 
countries are primarily focused on participation in the 
process of governance rather than in development per se, 
e.g., advocacy for environmental protection and consumer 
protection, the anti-nuclear movement; such organizations 
act as genuine channels of participatory democracy. But 
in developing countries, NGOs and CBOs are organized 
and viewed primarily as channels for effective delivery of 
services (Korten, 1992). 
In Nepal also, NGOs and CBOs have been more active as 
important avenues for development promotion than for 
political participation. Their modalities of operation, scope 
of work, funding sources, and their strength and weaknesses 
as development institutions have been analyzed in detail 
(Bhattachan, 1998; Acharya, 1997). Only a few of them such 
as Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN), the Informal Sector 
Service Center (INSEC), and some women's NGOs have been 
successful in raising issues and acting as advocacy groups. 
\iVomen's groups have been able to raise general awareness 
of women's rights. However, on political action they have 
fallen short. 
All sister or allied organi-
zations of political parties, 
including those of students, 
women, and labor (trade 
unions), have only recently 
started to act together to ad-
vance their group interests. 
Nevertheless, party alliances 
still predominate (Dahal, M, 
et al, 1999; Acharya, 2004), 
and their advocacy has not 
yet been converted into vot-
ing blocks. They have also be-
come part of the unprincipled 
politicking. Only since the 
late nineties have ethnic/caste 
based groups started to act as 
advocacy groups. 
THE MONARCHY AND THE ARMY 
• 
In Nepal, traditionally the monarchy as an institution has 
been viewed as the symbol of national unity and stability, 
and a strong barrier against intervention by neighbors. The 
monarchy has used this position several times to its advantage 
to maintain or reestablish its command over the country. 
So far, the Army has been vievvecl as its protector. Most of 
the Army Command comes from the Ranas, and a small 
section of the population who have benefited from serving 
them, although the Hill ethnic communities and Chetris 
constitute the rank and file. The Nepali Congress, which 
ruled most of the time during the democratic periods, never 
tried to modernize it. Rather, its leaders were in competition 
for the favor of Ranas, who dominated the Army and had 
command over most of the country's wealth. Even when the 
regime changed in 1951, the wealth amassed by pilfering 
the government treasury and indiscriminate land grants 
during the Ranas' 104-year-old rule was never returned 
to the treasury or the people (Regmi, 1976). In early years 
foreigners also were in contact only with the Ranas, as only 
they spoke English and matched their life styles. Incli.a played 
a crucial role in ensuring the Ranas were not treated harshly. 
The first government after the revolution of 1951 was he~clecl 
by a Rana prime minister. India played the middle-man role 
in this settlement (Shah, 1990, volume II). 
After 1990, the Army was still left untouched. The politi-
cal parties mostly ignored it, not thinking about its democ-
ratization, which they are now making a slogan. The clash 
with democratic government started only when the Army 
command, presumably with the King's consent, refused to 
move against the CPN-lvlaoists unless the political parties 
were united in their demand and imposed emergency. 
During the Panchayat era, particularly after King Biren-
clra's ascent to the throne, there were constant rumors that 
the palace was a cliviclecl house. Some of the royal family 
members wanted to treat the 
dissenting political forces 
more harshly. During the 
democratic movement of 
1990 this division of opin-
ion continued. However, 
the late King chose to make 
peace with his own people 
and did not bow clown to 
the Indian demand to sur-
render to them. He agreed to 
a constitution, which made 
the country a constitutional 
monarchy with multi-party 
democracy. This was not to 
the hard-liners' liking, and 
PHOTO: DAWN STIEF they were always ready tO 
find fault with the government and create instability where 
possible. Whether this was a planned move or just the ex-
pression of dissatisfaction, however, cannot be established. 
All political forces including the CPN-Maoists used each 
other for advancing their own agendas . 
INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO 
India and China 
Sandwiched between India and China, Nepal has great 
economic opportunities but very little space for its own 
independent policies and programs. Nepal has a much more 
intricate relationship with India than with China. China has 
been largely concerned with the stability and neutrality of 
Nepal and is therefore happy to support the establishment, 
no matter who is in power. Even throughout the Panchayat 
era, when it supported many revolutionary movements 
around the world, China's policies were neutral in Nepal. 
However, it did contribute to economic development by 
assisting in building roads, and establishing large import 
substitution industries. During the Cultural Revolution 
in China, Maoist literature was translated and distributed 
widely in Nepal and used to train left cadres. The short-lived, 
violent left movement in Nepal during the late sixties was 
also an offshoot of the Naxalite movement in India , which 
was probably supported by China. But currently China has 
clearly condemned the Maoists and by all indications has 
nothing to do with the insurgency. 
India is a different matter4 Apart from economic depen-
dency on India for access to the outside world, Nepal deals 
with continuous Indian intervention in Nepal's political 
affairs. Nepal's political elite preserved their internal au-
tonomy by assisting the British against India's independence 
struggle during Rana rule, and the Indian establishment has 
never made peace with the fact that Nepal was ·left as an 
independent nation when the British left India. Some Indian 
Congress leaders had wanted to annex Nepal as they did 
Hyderabad. But Nehru, with his vision of Panchasheel, did 
not agree to direct annexation. Nevertheless, a very unequal 
treaty was imposed on Nepal. Nepal's Rana rulers , who ne-
gotiated with India for their protection in the new regime , 
signed this Treaty of Friendship in 1950. This treaty will 
never lapse unless abrogated unilaterally, or changed by 
agreement of the two nations. 
The treaty forces Nepal to give priority to Indians in com-
petition with foreigners for exploitation of natural resources, 
in acquisition of property, and in investment opportunities on 
a par with Nepali citizens, and to allow citizens free mobility 
to each other's countries5 Moreover, it also provides that when 
buying arms or going to war, the two counti·ies will consult 
each other. In reality, India never consults Nepal on anything, 
while Nepal is kept under India's continuous surveillance. 
Even the US needs India's permission to send arms to Nepal. 
The democratic movement in 1990 was supported by Indian 
leaders, not from their love for democracy, but because Nepal 
was trying to move beyond this treaty by imposing a work 
permit requirement for all foreigners, including Indians, who 
sought to work in the Kathmandu Valley, and because Nepal 
tried to import some small arms directly from China. Since 
1950, the position of each party on this treaty has become a 
constant factor in Nepalese politics6 
Further, the Indian establishment is not satisfied with 
this treaty. They intervene continuously in Nepal's inter-
and intra-party competition and between the King and the 
political parties. They support one or the other and keep 
them fighting, and negotiate unequal treaties vvhen they are 
divided. Thus, India's support for democracy in Nepal has 
always been half-hearted and partisan, motivated by the de-
sire to put a particular leader or party in power. lvlost rulers, 
whether Ranas, kings, or prime ministers , have given in to 
such Indian pressure in the past. There have been only a few 
exceptions. The last King Birendra, one of those , chose to 
negotiate and give in to the democratic forces, rather than 
bow to India in 1990. 
Even today, according to close observers and Nepalese au-
thorities, including the ex-Prime Minister Soorya Bahadur 
Thapa, India is supporting both the King and the CPN-Mao-
ists to pressure the King for more unequal treaties, partiCLl-
larly to establish a priority claim on Nepal's water resources. 
The King is giving in slowly. Thus, though the CP.N-Maoists 
named abrogation of the 1950 treaty as well as the Mahakali 
Treaty with India among their major demands, now they 
have put the country under more Indian influence. There 
is no guarantee that the Indian establishment will not force 
Nepal into India's security umbrella before they move ef-
fectively against the CPN-Maoists. They need the King in 
Nepal for stability and the democratic structure to intervene 
in Nepal's political affairs. 
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Disintegration of the Soviet Socialist Block and Left 
Strength in Nepal 
After the disintegration of the socialist block, the left was 
completely demoralized in the international arena. But the 
communist parties of various shades together won only 
slightly fewer seats than the Nepali Congress (NC), and 
constituted a powerful block in the Nepalese Parliament 
elected in 1991. The CPN-Maoists also had nine seats of their 
own. The left forces in South Asia and the movements like 
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIJVl) watched the 
left's success in Nepal with great interest. But with the about 
turn of the CPN-UML on economic and social policies, and 
their intolerance of other left forces, ensuing intra-party and 
inter-party wrangling on forming the Government, extensive 
use of money and muscle during the subsequent elections, and 
finally the use of the Army by the NC government to subdue 
the social movement for implementation of even the existing 
laws, combined to belie the hope for a peaceful transition to 
a more socialistic economy. The forces in Nepal preferred to 
start an armed insurgency, most likely with the advice and 
help of Indian and international insurgent forces. 
At this moment , it is hard to prove such conjecture, but 
there are many signs. There is CPN-Maoist representation in 
the RIM high command, and Nepal's outgoing prime minis-
ter recently made a categor ical statement that CPN-Ivlaoists 
broke the last negotiations because they were directed to 
do so by Rllvl (Kantipur, 2004). A few years ago the CPN-
Maoists signed a pact with Indian CPN-Maoists, stating that 
when their respective countries are liberated from the capi-
talist system, Nepal and India will form a South Asian Com-
monwealth. Nepalese and Indian authorities believe that 
the insurgents are collaborating in planning and executing 
their actions across borders. The two left insurgent groups 
in India, Peoples' War Group (PWG) and Jvlaoist Commu-
nist Center of India (MCC), have now united into a Com-
munist Party of India (Maoist-Leninist)-CPI (ML). In 2003 
a Ivlaoist communist party, the Bhutanese Communist Party 
(MLM), was formed in Bhutan (www.nepalnews.com, Octo-
ber 14; Shrestha, 2005). Both parties have promised to work 
in collaboration with CPN (Maoists) in Nepal. India only 
recently has woken to this reality of insurgency cooperation 
and co-ordination. 
According to Lenin, imperialism should be hit where it is 
weakest in order to start international socialist revolution,. 
It seems from their activities that the International Revolu-
tionary movement has singled out this part of the world, 
in particular Nepal, as the best place to rouse their move-
ment. Nepal had undergone an intensive revolutionary un-
derground campaign in the late sixties and seventies. The 
democratic forces were quite weak. The Monarchy, smarting 
from the 1990 change of regime, could be used tactically 
against democracy. The poor peasantry and service castes, 
rapidly losing their traditional livelihood sources because of 
the invasion of factory-produced goods and globalization, 
could be readily lured to the utopian ideas of a communist 
state and equality. 
ECONOMIC POLICIES AND INCREASING 
DIFFERENTIATION 
Even though political mismanagement and the ensuing 
frustration provided the immediate background for the 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal, the continuing economic ex-
ploitation of the service castes and other ethnic groups by 
the landed class, and further impoverishment of rural areas 
and certain sections of the population, played a crucial role 
in its rapid spread7 
Economic Policies 
Much literature identifies the traditional economic 
exploitation of disadvantaged ethnic communities and 
Dalits by the high castes as the primary cause of their 
support for CPN-Maoists8 But such literature rarely deals 
with the impact of globalization policies on traditional 
patterns of exploitation, and consequent acceleration of class 
differentiation. Neither does it go into the precise economic 
processes by which this differentiation is taking place. The 
emphasis is on the traditional social structures, and impact 
studies of donor-funded programs9 
Nepal started its modernization venture with planned 
development in 1956. Early ye.ars were devoted to build\ng 
physical and social infrastructure. Benefits of growth were 
spread very unevenly. Even in 2001 an overwhelming ma-
jority of Nepal's population (86 percent in 2001) still lived 
in rural areas, and 20-21 districts remained unapproachable 
by roads. Moreover, most of the villages are still far from mo-
torable roads, even if roads reach the district headquarters. 
More accessible rural areas benefited from the construction 
'. 
of modern transportation facilities and social infrastructure. 
Although the economy grew 4-5 percent per annum during 
the eighties, disparity in income and access to resources was 
increasing. 
The structural adjustment program, which in its initial 
stages primarily benefits the well off, was started in the 
mid-eighties, and accelerated after the democratic changes 
of 1990. The liberalization process encompassed all sectors 
of the economy: agriculture, industry, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI), trade and exchange rate policies, the financial 
system, transport and communications, etc. The policy re-
forms in the external sector were the most comprehensive 
and far-reaching. Nepal now has the lowest import tariff rates 
in South Asia, and full convertibility of Nepalese Rupees on 
current account. Its FDI policies are liberal (Acharya, K. et 
al., 1998). This process further deepened the existing cleav-
ages and created new disparities . 
The next section examines in some detail the process of 
impoverishment of these sections of the population. Before 
that a brief review of donor role in the economic policy-mak-
ing process is presented, as government policies and pro-
grams in Nepal are formulated and implemented in close 
collaboration with the donors. 
THE ROLE OF DONORS IN ECONOMIC 
DECISIONS 
Donors often blame the leaders of the developing countries 
for failures of development programs. Nepal is no exception 
to this rule . Currently, past failures are blamed on inward-
looking policies or inadequate liberalization. There is very 
little inclination among the donors to examine their own 
policies and programs for elements which might have led to 
accelerated mass impoverishment and disillusionment with 
the system and prepared a fertile ground for CPN-Maoist 
insurgency. 
When Nepal embarked on its planned development in 
1956, there were fevv graduates or even educated admin-
istrators. Since then bilateral and multilateral donors have 
played the major role in Nepal's policy making (Panclay, 
1999; Acharya, Khatiwacla and Aryal, 2004). Even after 
1990, with plenty of human resources and alternative opin-
ions in the country, the major political parties, fearful the 
donors would withdraw and lured by offers of assistance, 
accepted whatever was offered to them instead of request-
ing aiel for their own. Western donors are still so afraid of 
the Communist name that even a slightly-left-of-the-center 
party raises alarms. This was one the factors in overthrow-
ing the CPN-UML government in the mid nineties 10 
The 1989-1990 movement for democracy in Nepal was 
successful only because it was widely supported by the left 
parties working underground in Nepal throughout the Pan-
chayat era. The overthrow of the moderate communist party, 
the CPN-UML, with a social-democratic platform, discred-
ited its ideology of peaceful ways to social revolution, and 
strengthened the hard liners within the left. Many of the 
left cadres, who had been trained in Marxist ideology for 
the thirty years of Panchayat rule, were disappointed, and 
probably joined the extreme left. Currently nobody knows 
who the CPN-Maoist middle-level cadres are, while most 
of the Central Committee members were very much a part 
of the united left in the 1989-1990 movement. So there is 
very little ground now for the donors to blame the emerging 
disparities and discontent entirely on the traditional social 
divisions. Only after the Maoist insurgency are they starting 
to reexamine their policies and programs. But the focus is 
still on liberalization and privatization. Social policies still 
do not constitute an integral part of the agenda. 
From a review of development cooperation, Rana and 
Sharma (2003) conclude that the country has been a major 
playground for development experimentation, without an 
internal vision and clear understanding about an effective 
mechanism to address the root cause of poverty in the coun-
try. This has resulted in: 
• Failure to contribute substantially to poverty reduction; 
•Creation of a persistent dependency on external aid; 
• Division of the society into a few benefiting from the aid 
now and the many deprived of such benefits; and 
•Antagonism among the general population towards in-
ternational cooperation, the very state apparatus that has 
fueled and escalated the CPN-Maoist connict. 
Firstly, although unequal income distribution and the 
need to base growth more broadly have been noted often 
since the mid-seventies (Chenery et al., 1974), these issues 
were relegated to the margin. Growth is still emphasized as 
the first priority. "People's participation" has been a constant 
part of the World Bank policy recommendations since the 
mid-seventies, but after twenty-five years, poverty in 100 
countries has increased, not decreased, as noted by UNDP 
(2000), and the World Bank (2001) once again has had to 
emphasize that human poverty is a multi-dimensional prob-
lem that needs to be attacked simultaneously in all its di-
mensions. But whether a globalization process controlled by 
interest groups, whose primary objective is to make money 
for their own sake, can generate adequate resources for the 
mass of the population on the planet-and distribute them 
properly to ensure poverty eradication-is yet to be seen. So 
far the indications have not been positive. 
World leaders and international development agencies 
love to dress the same old political commitments in new 
language and then forget about them. The ideas generated 
become a fad for a short time, forcing all aid recipients to 
rewrite their plans and programs in the newly fashionable 
language. By the time they conclude this exercise new fads 
are generated. Commitments made earlier are completely 
forgotten. For example the Social Summit, which commit-
ted both the donors and the developing countries to specific 
millennium targets to reduce poverty, is now almost forgot-
ten by most developed countries. While-enormous amounts 
are spent on wars with illusory objectives, very few devel-
oped countries have fulfilled the target of contributing 0.7 
percent of their GDP as aid to developing countries, which 
was agreed upon 30 years ago. 
Donors emphasize theoretical assumptions. Individual 
·examples of success are presented as general phenomena, 
rarely examined as specific ground realities. Nepal is a very 
clear example of this. A few policy examples in Nepal are the 
emphasis on agriculture, liberalization of external trade, and 
FDI now and governance. 
Emphasis on agriculture in Nepal has almost become a cli-
che by now. From the First Plan in 1956, agricultural growth 
has been emphasized, but with limited success. Agriculture 
to a large extent still depends on the vagaries of nature , and 
average land productivity has declined rather than increased 
since the seventies. The major factors in Nepal's agricultural 
stagnation are lack of infrastructure and competition from 
lower-cost , subsidized Indian products. While the first fac-
tor started to receive attention in the last decade, the second 
is still ignored in policy analysis. Propagation of high value 
crops cannot be a short-term solution to mass poverty gener-
ated by low competitiveness of mass-produced crops. Even 
Nepalese vegetables and fruits cannot compete with Indian 
products that are supported by low infrastructure cost and 
multiple subsidies. This has implications for both agriculture 
and manufacturing. Even the orange juice manufactured in 
Nepal is not based on Nepalese oranges, although Nepal is 
supposed to produce the best oranges. 
Since Nepal is a small country, the emphasis on agricul-
ture and trade was correct at the macro level. But the em-
ployment/income multiplier of trade was never examined in 
Nepal's specific labor market context. Except for a few cases 
such as carpets, knitwear, and pashmina shawls, the direct 
and indirect multiplier effects of the manufacturing indus-
tries have been largely exported. As a consequence, the rea-
sonable GDP growth rates since the early eighties had little 
impact on employment and income generation for the poor 
and disadvantaged sections of the rural population. More-
over, accessibility of the vast Indian market, always assumed 
in donor advised macro-economic policies, has been elusive 
since the early sixties 11 (Acharya, 1995; Khan, 1999). 
It is assumed that with liberalization, larger FDl \Nill now 
automatically to Nepal. But in reality, FDl comes to Nepal 
only if its products can enter the Indian market freely, or in 
more favorable conditions, than products from other coun-
tries. And more than 75 percent of FDI now to Nepal is from 
India, which comes not only with capital but labor as well. So 
except in a few cases, the multiplier effect is largely exported. 
This blindness continues today among the larger donors . 
For example, the World Bank (NDPR, 2004) is talking about 
land market, privatization, liberalization of exit policies for 
organized sectors, Export Processing Zones, and expectation 
of high FDI innow even under the current situation of con-
nict, when the rural areas are largely under the control of the 
insurgents, and the land of larger land-holders has been con-
fiscated and distributed to the tillers. Privatization is pushed 
incessantly, even in sectors such as drinking water, health, 
and education. Ceilings on land holdings are supposed to 
be lifted, and exit policies for labor made easier without any 
program for redeployment of labor. These are fundamental 
issues to which most of the left forces, mcludmg the CPN-
Maoists, are opposed. Hoping for negotiated settlement with 
the CPN-Maoists on the one hand and pushing these issues 
incessantly on the other creates 
a paradox. 
While there is no dispute that 
without growth, equity can-
not be achieved, emphasizing 
growth and addressing the eq-
uity issues with small-scale pro-
grams such as micro-credit is no 
help . The first priority should 
be to make growth inclusive. 
As long as the growth path itself 
generates new inequities and 
deepens the existing ones, small 
add-on social protection pro-
grams are inadequate to redress 
the inequities. Such relocation of 
priorities is likely to give a different policy package from the 
emphasis on growth as the first priority. For example, in Ne-
pal a general liberalized trade regime is likely to draw most 
economic activities to regions and districts vvith advanced 
infrastructure facilities, as in the last decade. In the context 
of social upheavals, relocating new economic activities to the 
Mid-West and Far-West regions must be a priority, which 
would not emerge if growth were accorded the first priority. 
The problems of poverty and socio-economic exclusion in 
these areas are too big to be addressed by add-on packages 
of social protection. 
Currently donors are talking about governance. But 
governance is made into a completely technical problem. 
Privatization is supposed to plug all leakages, which is not 
supported by practice, as evident from cases of massive cor-
ruption in developed countries as well . Privatization mostly 
converts practice considered illegal under state control into 
legal practice, e.g., commissions for agency work. Further, 
the focus in governance is often limited to education and 
health-services delivery, where the problem is supposed to 
be solved by further privatization and larger government ex-
penditure. Other important governance issues never get at-
tention. In Nepal, equally important are land management, 
citizenship, customs and border management, police and 
judiciary. All these services have been a fertile ground for 
corruption. Even land entitlements are not kept properly; 
people have been cheated and public land has been trans-
ferred to political workers. Grant of citizenship has been 
converted into a money-minting exercise, while for authentic 
Nepali citizens, specifically for women and the dalits, the pro-
cess has been converted into a nightmare. All this has impor-
tant and widespread impact .on people's everyday life, which 
feeds their resentment of the system. No donor wants to pay 
attention to these issues. 
Similarly, in spite of commitment to decentralization in 
their programs, donors have wasted huge amounts of money 
on strengthening the district bureaucracy without making 
sure that the work and powers of the central bureaucracy are 
transferred to them. On the other hand they have contrib-
uted substantially to raising the 
pay scale of the central bureau-
cracy. The Participatory District 
Development Program, which 
was supposed to strengthen the 
bottom-up planning process, is 
now mostly geared to providing 
micro-credit to the groups orga-
nized under the program (Acha-
rya and ·wright, 2000). 
Thus, although Nepal has 
received a continuous flow of 
substantial amounts of exter-
nal resources in the last 40-45 
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has remained highly inefficient 
and the impact on poverty alleviation marginal at most. Ex-
ternal aiel might have actually accentuated the problem of 
poverty by increasing regional, inter-community, and inter-
personal disparity in income and human development. 
PROCESSES TRIGGERED BY ECONOMIC POLICIES 
Erosion of the Village Livelihood Systems 
Until recently the village economy used the service castes 
and paid for them in cash or in kind. With the onslaught 
of factory-made plastic utensils, bags, textiles, farm imple-
ments, and many other goods, these castes have lost the 
market for their skills. With the decline of the role of the 
household as an organization of production, manufactur-
ing activities have been increasingly externalized, and both 
male as well as female workers have lost control over the 
production process configured by self-employment, and 
have been transformed into wage laborers, with few alter-
native employment opportunities. In this process, women 
and the poor were affected more, since newly emerging orga-
nized industries needed not only more capital but also more 
educated and mobile laborers . 
On the other hand, as land holdings were divided and sub-
divided among the landed households because of population 
pressure , the agricultural labor market has also shrunk for 
the landless service castes. The service castes have no big 
landlords in need of labor to employ them as agricultural 
labor. The middle class, instead of investing in land, is set 
on selling the land to send their children abroad. Or they 
are converting land to forestry, fruit orchards, or some other 
plantation with a long gestation period, eroding the food se-
curity system of the villages. The poor are left with no access 
to resources or alternative employment. 
Further, the ban on traditional crops like hashish, and on 
small-scale alcohol manufacturing by women for the local 
market, without alternative crops or enterprises, as in Rolpa 
and Rukkum has been noted by other authors (Gersony, 
2003) as being among important causes of the Maoist move-
ment , which started in these districts. Failure of the Rapti 
Rural Development project to address the needs of the poor-
er areas further aggravated the problem. Similar conclusions 
can be related to Siraha and Sarlahi, the Terai districts of 
CPN-Maoist concentration. Ethnic women's frustration and 
opposition over the State's ban on local production of alcohol 
was already noted in 1977 (Molnar, 1981). While the local 
production of alcohol is banned, FDls and nationally owned 
factories can produce and distribute alcohol freely. 
Until about 1980, Nepal had relatively free land, where 
the poor and lower middle class had user rights. They could 
easily move and occupy government land with impunity. 
National forests were accessible to all for grazing animals, 
fuel , and fodder. It was disastrous for the country, for the 
land and forest resources were being exhausted fast. For 
the poor, however, it was a means of livelihood. They could 
move to higher-levelland. Although land with low produc-
tivity, it was a resource. 
Further large tracts of private and sometimes also public 
land have been enclosed by the powerful and strong in the 
name of commercial agriculture. This process parallels the 
16'h century enclosures in England (see Polanyi , 1957 for the 
analysis of the events). Then, in England, the poor flocked to 
the cities and found employment there; even then the Eng-
lish government had to pass the infamous Poor Laws. But in 
Nepal the poor have novvhere to go. 
Earlier, the poor could raise and graze livestock on com-
munity land. They could gather berries and fuel for sale and 
earn their livelihood. All this stopped with the introduction 
of lease and community forestry. It is true that these mea-
sures have helped to regenerate the forests to some extent, 
but they have also closed the avenues of livelihood to many. 
Community forestry is one of the main strategies adopted 
by the government for forestry management in recent years 
since the Seventh Five-year Plan, but particularly after 1990. 
Traditionally, raising calves for breeding and other animals 
for meat was a more practical and accessible activity for the 
landless, and for marginal households and women. Small 
livestock-raising has been the main activity of the poor in all 
micro-credit programs But with the emphasis o.n improved 
stock, commercial livestock-raising, and enclosure of public 
lands by the village elite, community forests and free pub-
lic grazing lands have disappeared and such small-scale 
livestock raring activities have become impossible. In most 
cases relatively better-off households in the village have mo-
nopolized the community forests. The poor households did 
not understand its importance in the beginning and did not 
participate on a large scale. There is no more community 
land left. This factor has limited the scope of livestock-rais-
ing as a poverty alleviation strategy in remote and difficult 
areas, precisely those areas where poverty is concentrated. 
The erosion of the more or less food-self-sufficient house-
holds and the village economy without alternative , equally 
productive avenues of employment and income, has had a 
very traumatic effect on poor households. 
Limited Impact of Export or Other Non-agriculture 
Sector Growth on Alternative Employment and Income 
Opportunities 
With the construction of roads, market penetration in the 
hinterland was begun in the 1960s and 1970s. However, 
protection oflocal producers and cottage and household-level 
industries also formed an important part of the development 
strategy then. With more focus on liberalization, the 
evaporation of a local market for locally produced products 
and services accelerated significantly. 
The organized non-agriculture sector was not able to gen-
erate a wide enough labor market to absorb the labor freed 
by the erosion of the village livelihood systems, although 
it grew faster after the liberalization, and its contribution 
to GDP went up by about 20 percentage points in the 20 
years since 1980. The contributions of manufacturing, trade, 
restaurants, hotels, and construction particularly have in-
creased in proportion to the decline in agriculture (see Da-
hal et al. , 1999; Panday, 1999; Khan, 2000; Acharya et al., 
2004). The general conclusion is that these policy packages 
have reduced the role of agriculture in production and in-
creased the market penetration into the household economy, 
without substantial positive impact on the employment op-
portunities and livelihood options for the poor in general 
and the women in particular. 
For liberalization or accelerated growth of the modern 
sector to benefit the masses, it must generate adequate and 
more productive employment for them. Increased employ-
ment is the only channel through which the benefits of glo-
balization may trickle down to the poor. The problem of job 
creation is acute in Nepal. A majority of the unemployed are 
not educationally prepared to take advantage of the expand-
ing modern labor market, and also face severe competition 
from migrant labor from India . 
Unemployment also exists wit.nin the lower middle class 
with small pieces of farmland and comparatively higher reser-
vation prices of labor. In spite of the emerging unemployment 
problem among the educated youth from the lower middle 
class, this group is not willing to work as physical labor with-
in the country. Nor do they want to go back to farming-and 
hence they provide a fertile ground for the CPN-Maoist re-
cruitment, as well as a source of migrants to overseas. 
Reinforcement of traditional factors of differentiation 
Market penetration and globalization have reinforced some of 
the traditional differences in access to resources, knowledge, 
and power, based on ethnicity, caste hierarchy, and gender. 
Traditionally, Nepalese society had multiple social divi-
sions based on ethnicity, geography, and caste. Gender is 
another cross-cutting factor. According to the 2001 census, 
there were 100 ethnic/caste groups and sub-groups in Ne-
pal. The first dividing line that can be drawn is between the 
castes and ethnic populations, who consist of a few major 
and many minor groups with less than 500 in number. For-
ty-eight such janajati groups are registered in Nepal. While 
the Hindu population is organized on the basis of caste hi-
erarchy, the ethnic population has no such caste divisions in 
principle, although social differentiation within the groups 
do exist in practice in some groups, for example among the 
Newars. In 2001 the caste groups constituted 57.5 percent 
of the population, the janajatis 37.2 percent, and the reli-
gious minorities 4.3 percent (Appendix Table 1; for details 
see TPAMF, 2004). 
There is a similar diversity in native languages of the pop-
ulation. Ten languages, including those spoken by at least 
1.5 percent of the population, accounted for 90 percent of 
the population (Appendix Table 2). It is one of the divid-
ing factors between the Madheshis (plains people) and the 
hill people. Madheshis, although within the Hindu caste 
hierarchy, speak north Indian local languages, while eth-
nic groups have their own languages. Nepali is the mother 
tongue for 49 percent of the population, the lingua franca 
for other communities, and the only language allowed in of-
ficial transactions. This has become a contentious issue for 
all non-Nepali speakers. Non-recruitment to the Army is 
another issue raised by the Madheshis. 
The ethnic and Madheshi populations want a federal state 
structure along linguistic divides, use of local language in 
local government business, and more equitable representa-
tion in the political and administrative echelons of power 
(Gurung, 2003). 
The Hindu group is divided into multiple groups by caste, 
which often overlaps with class. Brahmans are at the top 
of the hierarchy and the Dalits (traditional service castes, 
or untouchables at the bottom). Recent information on 
comparative socio-economic and political status of various 
Table 1. Long-term Issues for Nepal 
Political 
groups shows that Dalits and some of the ethnic groups, par-
ticularly from the Terai and remote areas, had almost zero 
access to higher education and positions of power. As dis-
cussed above, economic modernization and the structural 
adjustment programs had a disproportionately intense im-
pact on them and increased the traditional differentiation 
in their access to resources, knovvledge, and employment 
opportunities. They are agitating for more equitable access 
to resources, education, and power. 
Although nearly 81 percent of the population has declared 
itself Hindu in the 2001 Census, a large group is Buddhist. 
People also practice a number of other indigenous religions . 
The issue of the Hindu State, which was taken up originally 
only by the recent Christian converts, has now become a 
contentious issue for most non-Hindu ethnic elites in the 
country, who claim their own religion or Buddhism. 
These sources of conflict overlap with crosscutting issues 
such as poverty and gender, which tend to intensify the 
problems of socio-political disadvantage. Gender discrimi-
nation cuts across all castes, ethnicity, geography, and class. 
Women are discriminated against not only socially but even 
in law. There are 54 laws and 120 by-laws and clauses which 
discriminate against women (FLWD, 2000), in spite of the 
fact that Nepal's constitution says that any law contravening 
the International Agreements to which Nepal is a party is 
void. Major areas of legal discrimination include citizenship 
and property rights. More equitable access to resources, edu-
cation, and power form the major points of their demands. 
OVERALL IMPACT 
As a consequence of the multiple factors discussed above, 
Nepal was not able to make any significant gains in reducing 
income poverty, especially in rural areas in the last three 
decades. Even a World Bank (Prennusi, 1999) estimate put 
42 percent of the Nepalese below the basic-needs poverty 
line in 1995\96-that is, unable to meet their basic needs of 
minimum calories, shelter, drinking water, basic education, 
and primary health care. 
Socio-Cultural Economic 
A. Governance Structure Status of languages other than Neo-liberal 
1. Position of Monarchy Nepali 
2. Decentralized or Federal Hindu or Secular State Social Democratic 
3. Representation of social groups in Social status of Dalits 
Power structure Legal and Status of Women Socialist 
• Citizenship 
B. Foreign policy Overall-Relation to the • Property 
World powers • Other 
1950 Treaty with India Citizenship issue of the Indian 
India-Nepal border emigrants 
Other unequal treaties 
Gorkha recruitment 
Traditional divisions entwined with class differentiation 
and the urban/rural/regional divide have combined to pro-
duce deeper differentiation in access to resources, educa-
tion and power structure (See Appendix Tables 3 and 4 and 
TPAMF, 2004 for details) and resulted in mass frustration for 
the service castes, poor women, and many youths from all 
communities, especially disadvantaged ones. New conflict 
points generated by such developments cut across gender, 
caste, and ethnicity, and include the rural/urban divide in 
access to resources, highly educated/uneducated or semi-
educated in access to new sources of livelihood , the capital-
ist/feudal divide among the haves, capitalist/worker divide, 
lower peasantry/capitalist/feudal divide, and the like. 
The fact that liberalization has led to a more dualistic 
world economy has also been noted by UNDP in 1995 Hu-
man Development Report (HDR): 
"Since 1980 there has been a dramatic surge in economic growth 
in 15 countries, bringing rapidly rising incomes to many of their 
1. 5 billion people, more than a quarter of the world 's population .. 
Over much of this period , however, economic decline or stagnation 
has affected 100 countries, reducing the incomes of 1.6 billion 
people-again , more than a quarter of the world's population. In 
70 of these countries average incomes are less than they were in 
1980-and in 43 countries less than they were in 1970". 
It labels this growth as: "jobless-ruthless-voiceless-
rootless-[ utu reless." 
Nepal is a clear example of this dualistic development. No 
wonder the Maoist insurgency in Nepal is finding support 
from the impoverished rural population. Most insurgencies 
in history have been peasant movements, and the Maoist 
movement is one of them 12 CPN-Maoists are finding their 
main recruits from the service castes, disadvantaged com-
munities and women, who have been the major losers in the 
accelerated market penetration of the rural economy, partly 
as a consequence of market-oriented development and partly 
because of structural adjustment policies. The World Bank 
(2004) itself had to accept the link between the development 
indicators by districts and the intensity of the Maoist insur-
gency in its recent policy revie·w paper. 
PROSPECTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 
Thus the issues for a negotiation with the CPN-Maoists are 
multiple and are both short and long term. CPN-Maoist 
insurgents, with their communist propaganda of equality 
in all fields, have been able to exploit all these grievances. 
Their agenda of socio-political change is framed accordingly. 
A major question is whether agreement with CPN-Maoists is 
possible in this scenario. · 
In an immediate perspective the negotiations seem to be 
deadlocked between CPN-Maoists wanting a Round Table 
Conference with the King's direct participation and Constitu-
ent Assembly, with the pa lace/Government not responding to 
the first and not agreeing to the second. Issues on the agenda 
for negotiation in the longer term are summarized in the table 
below. It clearly shows that the Maoist agenda for a socialist 
state and Republic are likely to remain as points of disagree-
ment on any longer term perspective. Of the three contend-
ing parties-the democratic forces, the Army/King or the 
CPN-Maoists-who will surrender will depend on military 
strength on the one hand and popular support on the other. 
The issues of structural discriminat ion have been aggra-
vated in the last decade because of political corruption, lack 
of social perspective in economic policies of structural ad-
justment, rising expectations of the masses, and social tradi-
tionalism among the politicians. Economic policies fostering 
dependency on foreign aid and foreign employment have led 
to the emergence of new classes, "fragmented personalities", 
and "multiple states" leading to contradictory decisions, 
constant shifts in inter- and intra-party political coalitions 
to exploit the state resources, growth of non-competent 
bureaucracy, and radicalism among the overdeveloped non-
productive classes. In Nepal this radicalism has resulted in 
the CPN-Maoist insurgency. This radicalism found ready 
ground for its activities among the impoverished masses. 
(See Table l for the long-term issues that need a solution) 
As for finding compromises acceptable to the conflicting 
parties, the most difficult issues seem to be those related to 
the monarch, state structure, and foreign (specifically relating 
to India) and economic policies. Currently CPN-UML, NSP, 
and NC have joined hands to form a government, which also 
has two King's representatives. The government can hardly 
move towards negotiations with the CPN-Maoists without 
the King's (Army) concurrence. The mother NC together with 
splinter left parties and splinter NSP are still agitating, pre-
sumably for restoration of the dissolved House, while the King 
and the government want to conduct new elections. There are 
differences within the government as to what to do first: nego-
tiate with the CPN-Maoists or hold an election. 
In spite of the differences in language used by various po-
litical parties, there is an agreement on the issue that the 
system needs to be more equitable and participatory, taking 
into account the caste hierarchy, the ethnic and the geo-
graphical divisions, and gender. A meaningful devolution of 
power redrawing the boundaries and reducing the number 
of districts or a federal structure may be debated. Reserva-
tion of seats in the National Parliament or a more powerful 
Upper House representing and having the decisive voice in 
ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and gender issues may also be 
considered. The need for strengthening the prime ministe-
rial system guaranteeing the fundamental rights, rule of law, 
etc. is also mostly agreed upon. 
Differences are large on the political agenda. Although all 
major parties agree on the question of vesting sovereignty in 
the people, different parties interpret this clause differently. 
The parliamentary parties want to reduce powers of the 
Monarchy accorded by the 1991 constitution. The outgoing 
government , which was much closer to the King's position, 
proposed development of the monarchical system in accor-
dance with its status and dignity defined by the 1991 con-
stitution, although it has not made clear what 'development 
of the system' means. According to the King's one interview, 
he wants a more active role in governance, using his pow-
ers to draw the attention of the authorities towards dissent-
ing views of various sections of the population. He wants to 
play a constructive role to strengthen the democratic system 
within the constitutional framework. Political parties are 
very suspicious of this constructive role. 
or particular importance is the de-facto structure and 
command of the Army. The parliamentary parties and the 
CPN-Maoists contend that it is currently controlled by the 
palace. They seek to transfer its control fully to elected gov-
ernment, after giving it a national character, whereas the 
establishment claims that the Army is already under the 
control of the Parliament. Additionally, the NCP-CPN-Mao-
ists demand to include its insurgent army and militia in the 
Army's reorganization. This is a tricky issue, which needs to 
be resolved before any election can take place. 
The CPN-Maoists wish to determine the King's future 
through referendum or an elected constituent assembly, and 
propose amendment of any provision of the constitution 
through referendum. The establishment, on the other hand, 
has said that the sacrosanct elements of the constitution 
should not be subject to referendum. 
On the state structure the differences are also quite sig-
nificant. The CPN-CPN-Maoists have offered the right of 
self-determination to ethnic groups (whether it means the 
Soviet or Chinese model). The five parliamentary parties 
and the establishment would accept the plurality existing in 
the country but they would deal with it within the unitary 
state structure by empowering local self-government to de-
cide local matters . 
Foreign policy, particularly the degree of closeness to In-
dia , is another point of discord . NCP-CPN-Maoists vvould 
like to revoke the 1950 Treaty with India , as well as what 
they call unequal treaties with the western countries, and 
close the Gorkha recruitment centers. No other party would 
go to that extent. 
Similarly, the CPN-Maoists and other left groups prefer 
a secular state, while the democtatic front of all hues and 
colors would only make the interpretation of existing provi-
sions on practice of religion more liberal. 
In spite of the principle of gender equality to which all 
parties pretend to agree, equality in citizenship rights is not 
even on the negotiating table. Even the so-called revolution-
ary CPN-Maoists have not been able go beyond the con-
ventional lvlarxist approach to women's issues. It is not free 
of patriarchal value systems (Pettigrew and Shneiderman, 
2004). To go by historical evidence from the former socialist 
bloc and China, a socialist or a !Vlarxist regime makes wom-
en's choices more limited by curtailing individual freedom 
on marriage, family life, children, etc. It does provide some 
space for participation in public life, but still excludes them 
from decision-making positions. 
The major difference between the CPN-CPN-Maoists on 
the one hand and the other two parties on the other is on 
economic policies. While the CPN-CPN-Maoists demand a 
total socialist agenda of change, the CPN-UMN and other 
left parties seem to be more for a more mixed economy, 
while the democratic parties and the establishment are for 
neo-liberal economic policies. That seems to be the crux of 
the problem in the long run. 
LESSONS 
Importing institutional structures does not establish 
democracy. Democracy must be context-specific and evolve 
out of internal conditions. The structures that develop must 
represent existing political forces within the country. 
Current capitalist commercialization and globalization 
is not only an economic process. Although economics does 
form the foundation for other aspects of globalization, it is 
a multi-dimensional process creating a culture of unlimited 
wants and massive dissatisfaction with conditions of depri-
vation. Economically, globalization creates massive econom-
ic disparities, hitting the poorest the hardest. People can 
not tolerate for long the increasing deprivation on the one 
hand and unprecedented affluence on the other. Politically 
globalization concentrates resources and power among the 
rich and powerful , both globally and nationally, reinforcing 
traditional inequities. For globalization to advance smoothly 
it must grow out of a country's economic needs and competi-
tive capacity. If imposed from outside it is bound to cause 
massive socio-economic dislocations. 
The only way the structural adjustment and privatization 
programs can have a positive impact on poverty is through 
increased private sector investment and FDI and the em-
ployment-income-employment multiplier cycle. The masses 
are supposed to benefit from this expansion of opportunities 
by investment in education. But this cycle is affected by mul-
tiple other social, political, and contextual economic factors, 
which are conveniently ignored in the economic models. 
The assumed transmission mechanism rarely materializes, 
unless specific social, political, and structural factors are 
taken into account . Nepal may be taken as a glaring example 
where these assumptions did not materialize. By now it is Small countries like Nepal have very little space to ma-
clear that all East and South Asian countries so often pre- neuver. They cannot opt out of the global system. The choice I 
sented as examples of market-led development were really for them is not integration or no integration in the world 
led by the State (Klitgaard, 1991). economy. They are already integrated into the world econ-
While the growth path itself generates new inequities and omy, oi1e way or another. The issue is that of changing the 
deepens existing ones, to expect minor add-on social pro- terms of integration to benefit the masses and not only the 
tection programs such as micro-credit and food-for-work to international/national capital and the few who control it. 
redress the inequities is very unrealistic. These programs are Globalization policies must be rooted in the country-spe-
often too small to have an impact on mass scale employment cific realities and perceived to be just and leading to overall 
loss. Moreover, micro-credit can work only when there are improvement in the living standards of the masses. ln Ne-
adequate market opportunities as in Bangladesh, not in the pal much of the macro-economic policymaking has failed 
inaccessible areas like those where Nepal's poor live. ln Ne- to yield the results expected of them, precisely because the 
pal, multiple government and NGO/lNGO programs with models used for policy conclusions do not incorporate ad-
micro-credit supplied less than five percent of the total ru- equate dimensions of Nepalese, and the international con-
ral credit and covered less than 3 percent of the borrowing textual reality, such as market constraints on exports, lndia 
population (Acharya et al., 2003). or overseas, or the free flow of labor and capital between 
Emphasizing just growth and looking at the macro picture lndia and Nepal. 
only without specific attention to groups who suffer from Similarly democracy is about balancing interests of vari-
these policies is bound to generate political upheavals. The ous groups. One cannot impose policies in abstract and 
growth path itself must lead to more equitable distribu- hope that everything will go well. ln this age of democratic 
tion of opportunities and access to resources. This can be aspirations and equitable development, our model cannot be 
achieved only if there is a mechanism in place for participa- Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia , China, or Cuba, where 
tory democracy in reality and not a system dominated by political freedom was totally suppressed during the early 
the traditionally powerful and the strong socio-economic stages of economic development. The political economy of 
groups and the rising capitalist class. development must be at the center of all economic policies. 
Appendix Table l: Ethnic\Caste Composition of the Population 
I~.Wi1f[t'lt{lliJ~ ft!t lfJJ 't!b 
A Caste Grou]JS 57.5 
A.1 High Castes (Al.l+Al.2) 32.8 
A.l.l Hill B/C+ (Brahman, Chhetri, Thakuri, Sanyasi) 30.9 
A.l.2 Terai B/C+ (Brahman, Raiput, Kayastha, Baniya, Marwadi,Jaine, Nurang, Bengali) 1.9 
A.2 Terai Middle Castes (Yadav, Teli , Kalwar, Sudhi, Sonar, Lahar, Koiri, Kurmi, Kanu, Haluwai, 
Hajam/Thakur, Badhe, Bahae, Rajbhar, Kewat, Mallah, Nuniya, Kumhar, Kahar, Lodha, 
Bing/Banda, Bhediyar, Mali, Kamar, Dhunia) 12.9 
A.3 Dalits 11.8 
A.3 .1 Hill Dalits (Kami, Damai, Sarki, Gaine, Badi) 7.l 
A.3.2 Terai Dalits (Chamar, Musahar,Dhusadh/Paswan, Tatma, Khatway, Bantar, Dom, Chidimar, 
Dhabi, Halkhor, Dalit/Unidentified Dalit) 4.7 
B janajatis (Ethnic Groups) 37.2 
B.1 Hilljanaiatis (B.l.l+B.l.2) 28.5 
B.l.l Newar/Thakali 5.5 
B.l.2 Other Hill Janajatis (Magar, Tamang, Rai, Gurung, Limbu, Sherpa, Bhote, Vlalung, 
Byansi, Hyolmo, Gharti/Bhujel, Kuma!, Sunuwar, Baramu, Pahari, Adivasi janajati, 
Yakkha, Chhantal, Jirel, Darai, Dura Majhi, Danuwar, Thami, Lepcha, Chepang, Bote, 
Raii, Hay_u, Raute, Kusunda 23.0 
B.2 Terai janajatis (Tharu, Dhanuk, Rajbanshi, Tajpuriya, Gangai, Dhimal, Meche, Kisan, 
Munda, Santhal!Satar, DhangC~d/jhangad, Koche, Pattarkatta/Kusbadiya 8.7 
c. Religious Minorities 4.3 
D. Unidentified l.O 
Total 100 100 100 
-
. I 
-
Appendix Table 2: Major Languages Spoken in Nepal 
LANGUAGE GROUP PERCENT POPULATION 
Nepali (Hills) 48.6 
t'-'laithali (Terai) 12 .3 
Bhojpuri (Terai) 7.5 
Tharu (Terai) 5.9 
iamang (Hills) 5.2 
Newari (Hills) 3.6 
Magar (Hills) 3.4 
Awadhi (Terai) 2.5 
Gurung (Hills) 1.5 
Limbu (Hills) 1.5 
Total 92.0 
Appendix Table 3: Literacy Rate, Educational and Professional Attainment by Caste/Ethnicity, 2001 
~ /.4gjllrJ;II;I~Uc; [ftl{lll~:,l I:IIUir•.:.••[IJ~I Ulli!Ul:~t.'1., [l'mM,W . liiiii:!(U" 
Percent of 6 years + Percent of economically active 
Literacy SLC+ Graduate+ Non-agric. Administrators, Professionals, 
occupations managers, Technicians , 
politicians, high and associates 
officials etc. 
Hill/Terai BIC+ 67.5 16.7 3.6 34.5 1.0 8.1 
Hill B/C+ 67.1 16.2 3.4 32.4 1.0 7.8 
Terai B/C+ 73 .9 24.8 6.5 69.2 1.7 12. 2 
Terai Middle Caste 41.7 7.0 1.1 36.3 0.3 3.0 
Dalits 33.8 1.3 0.1 30.7 0.1 0.6 
Hill Dalits 41.9 1.4 0.1 30.9 0 .1 0.7 
Terai Dalits 21.1 l.l 0.1 30.4 0 .0 0.5 
janajatis 53.6 6 .9 1.1 31.7 0.5 3.3 
Hill j anajatis 56.2 7.7 1.3 31.8 0.6 3 .6 
N ewa r/Tha ka l i 72.2 2.0.3 4.2 58.0 1.7 8.4 
Other Hill j anajatis 52.1 4.5 0.5 23.4 0.3 2.1 
Terai j anajatis 44.8 4.0 0 .5 31.3 0.2 1.9 
Religious Minorities 34.5 3.1 0.6 48.4 0.2 1.7 
Others 50.1 9.6 2.5 40.2 0.8 4.3 
Total 53 .7 9.4 1.8 33.6 0 .6 4.6 
Appendix Table 4: Female\Male Ratios of Education and Professional Attainment by Caste/ Ethnicity, 2001 
Hill!Terai B/C+ 
Hill B/C+ 
Terai B/C+ 
Terai Middle Caste 
Dalits 
Hill Dalits 
Terai Dalits 
Janajatis 
Hill Janajatis 
Newar/Thakali 
Other Hill j anajatis 
Terai j anajatis 
Religious Minorities 
Others 
Total 
Percent of 6 years + Percent of economically active 
Literacy SLC+ Graduate+ Non-agric. Administrators, Professionals\ 
72.5 46.0 
72.8 45.9 
69.1 46.1 
42.4 20.3 
57.2 27.4 
65.4 32.3 
36.1 18.7 
68.9 50.2 
73.1 56.4 
77.9 61.8 
71.4 50.5 
53.1 19.7 
46.3 24.8 
61.2 46.6 
65.8 43.6 
PHOTO: D AWN STIEF 
occupations managers, Technicians, 
politicians , high 
officials etc. 
and associates 
20.5 104.8 0.3 3.5 
19.5 110.4 0.3 3.4 
29.9 31.7 0.6 7.8 
11.2 46.6 0.1 0.8 
18.6 103.9 0.0 0.2 
19.5 117.2 0.0 0.3 
17.1 74.4 0.0 0.1 
35.3 95.4 0.2 1.8 
39.1 99.9 0.3 2.1 
43.6 75.7 0.8 6.3 
30.6 107.2 0.1 l.l 
8.3 74.5 0.0 0.5 
22.0 41.8 0.0 0.4 
32.3 80.2 0.3 2.6 
22.9 91.6 0.2 2.2 
ENDNOTES 
1 [editors' noLe: Articles in Himalaya volume XXIII number 1 
also explore this theme! 
2 For example see Compilat ion of their Election Man ifestos by 
the Poverty Watch Civic Forum, 1999. 
3 Please refer to the liDS Yearbooks , 1996 and 1997 fo r a review 
of the events. 
4 This section relies primarily on newspaper publications in Ne-
pal and India and a few books, which has been summarized by 
Dhungel in his recent paper (2004). [ed itors' note: See also Richard 
Bownas's paper in Himalaya XXlll:I for more on this topic! 
5 Even Kashmir and Assam may bar Indi an citizens from buying 
land in their states, but Nepal cannot impose such restrictions on 
Ind ian citizens by this treaty. 
6 See Shailendra Upadhaya, Tryst with Democracy 1991 and 
S.D. lvluni , India and Nepal1992 
7 See Gersony, 2003 and Shneiderman and Turin, 2004, for in-
depth analyses of specific districts within the Maoist hold. 
8 For a recent summary, see Lawoti, 2003. 
9 See llDS, 2004 for a summary literature review. 
10 The World Bank and the HvlF seemed alarmed when the UML 
government declared an old age social security of about US $ 2 per 
month, and budgeted NRS 200,000 to every Village Development 
Committee managed by the locally elected bodies. Currently these 
lenders consider this as the best program (2004). The Prime Min-
ister in offi ce requested me to convince the South Asian Director of 
ADB that they were only social democrats. l ca rried the message to 
the Director, after which he ca me to Nepa l to meet the governn;ent 
leaders. The V/orld Bank in the meantime cancelled its already ap -
proved loan for the A run Hydro electric project, wh ich it sa id was 
because of environmental reasons. But many Nepalis were very 
skeptical, and the Arun Project cancellation became an indica-
tion of how internation al lenders would treat the government, if 
it re~1ained in power. This became a good political issue , which 
the so-called democratic opposition, NC, picked up to oppose the 
minority government. 
11 Current examples are tea, pashmina, and medicine, all of 
which are Nepal's comparative advantage products, on which In-
dia has been imposing import duties on one or another pretext, 
in spite of the free access facilities incorporated in the currently 
operating Trade Treaty. 
12 For examples of in-depth case studies from Nepal, see Sh-
neiclennan and Turin, 2004 and Gersony, 2003 
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